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I. 
STATEMENT THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter arises from a lawsuit filed by Tim and Janet Thompson and 
Thompson's Auto Sales, Inc. against the City of Lewiston for a flood which 
occurred on its property as a result of a heavy rain storm which struck the City of 
Lewiston on May 19, 2006. The Thompsons and Thompson's Auto Sales, Inc. 
sued the City of Lewiston claiming damages allegedly caused by the flood. After 
the suit was filed, the Thompsons and Thompson's Auto Sales, Inc. filed 
bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy Trustee, Barry Zimmerman substituted in for the 
Thompsons and Thompson's Auto Sales, Inc. (For convenience and in accordance 
with I.A.R. 35(d), the Appellants will be hereinafter referred to as "the Thompsons" 
and the Respondent will hereinafter be referred to as lfThe City".) The City filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds design immunity and 
discretionary immunity. The District Court granted the City summary judgment on 
the grounds of discretionary immunity. The Thompsons have appealed the Court's 
Decision, In their initial brief, the Thompsons have also raised the issue of design 
immunity. 
B. PROCEEDINGS 
The City agrees with the Thompsons' description the Course of Proceedings 
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up to the time of the District Court's decision regarding the City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated March 20, 2008. Additionally, the City submits that the 
Course of Proceedings should include the events that occurred after March 20, 
2008. After the Honorable District Judge Carl Kerrick issued a Memorandum 
Opinion and Order granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
grounds of discretionary immunity on March 20, 2008, both parties filed Motions 
for Reconsideration. Both Motions for Reconsideration were denied by the Court 
on June 17, 2008. However, the District Court's decisions of March 20, 2008 and 
June 17, 2008 did not end the litigation. The District Court also ruled that there 
were material questions of fact with regard to Thompsons' claims of negligent 
maintenance. 
The Thompsons then filed a Petition with the Idaho Supreme Court for 
Permissive Appeai on Juiy 2, 2008. The District Court granted the Piaintiffs: 
Motion to file a Permissive Appeal on August 2, 2008. The Motion was filed with 
the Idaho Supreme Court. On October 30, 2008, the Supreme Court denied the 
Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
Thereafter, the parties resumed the litigation process. Shortly before the 
triai regarding the Thompsons' claim of negligent maintenance, the Thompsons 
conceded that they did not have sufficient evidence to establish a claim of 
negligent maintenance. At the same time, however, the Thompsons sought 
permission from the District Court to file an Amended Complaint which would add 
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claims of continuing trespass and continuing nuisance. The District Court 
dismissed the negligent maintenance claims and allowed an Amended Complaint to 
be filed on October 15, 2009. The Thompsons then filed for bankruptcy relief 
pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 11, United States Code. As a result of the 
bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Trustee, Barry Zimmerman, was substituted for the 
Plaintiffs on November 10, 2010 and the litigation moved forward. 
On July 1 5, 2011, the City filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment to 
dismiss the claim for continuing nuisance and continuing trespass. On July 26, 
2011, the District Court granted the City's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Thereafter, a Judgment was entered on February 29, 2012 by the District Court 
dismissing the Plaintiffs' claim. However, there is no evidence or documentation 
within the Court record that that the District Court's Judgment dated February 29, 
2012 vvas sent to the Thornpsons or their aitorney. As a resuit, on or about Juiy 
5, 2012, the District Court issued an Order granting relief from the Judgment of 
February 29, 2012 and reissued Judgment on July 5, 2012. The Plaintiffs filed 
a Notice of Appeal on June 18, 2012 and an Amended Notice of Appeal on July 
30, 2012. The Notice of Appeal, the Amended Notice of Appeal and Appellant's 
Initial Brief raise and discuss issues regarding discretionary immunity. The 
Appellant's Initial Brief also raises the issue of design immunity. The Thompsons 
have not, however, raised any issue pertaining to the dismissal of the claims of 
continuing nuisance and continuing trespass. 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or before May 19, 2006, the Thompsons owned a parcel of property at 
306 21 st St. in Lewiston, Idaho, on which Thompson's Auto Sales sold used cars 
and boats. The property is located in Lewiston, Idaho near the bottom of a hill and 
is adjacent to 21 st Street which descends down the hill in a south to north 
direction. The Thompsons' property is bounded on the south by Idaho Street 
(which is at a higher elevation than the Thompsons' property), and on the north by 
G Street (which is at a lower elevation than the Thompsons' property). The 
property is bounded on the east by 21 st Street. 
Prior to 2003, at the intersection of 21 st Street and Idaho Street, storm 
water flowing down 21 st Street was transported across Idaho Street through a 
valley gutter which was installed in the early 1990's. 
In 2003, the valiey gutter was causing traffic probiems. Due to the extreme 
dip of the valley gutter, cars had to slow down to turn onto Idaho Street to avoid 
the bottom of the car striking the pavement. A of John Watson, , 4, R. 33. 
Because of those traffic problems and other reasons, in May, 2003, Assistant City 
Engineer John Watson prepared a schematic or plan as a part of the 2003 Summer 
Street Maintenance Project to change the storm gutter system from a valiey gutter 
to a bubble-up gutter at the intersection 21 st Street and Idaho Street in the City 
of Lewiston. Affidavit of John " 3 and 4, R 33. Included as a part of 
the 2003 Summer Street Maintenance Project 'Nas a schematic for the installation 
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of the bubble-up system which would be placed under Idaho Street where it 
intersects with 21 5t Street. Affidavit of John Watson, " 4 - 5 and Ex. A, R. 33. 
The bubble-up system was designed to catch runoff water as it traveled 
down 21 st Street, allow the water to pass under Idaho Street, and bubble-up into 
the gutter on 21 st Street below the intersection. The storm water would then 
continue on down the gutter on 21 st Street. 
Shortly thereafter, in late May, 2003, the City prepared and sent out bid 
documents containing project plans and other information about the 2003 Summer 
Street Maintenance Project to various contractors. Affidavit of John Watson, , 6, 
R. 33. Contractors who were interested in working on the project submitted their 
bids to the City. The bids were reviewed by Mr. Watson. Affidavit of John 
Watson, '6 -7, R. 33 - 34. After reviewing the bids, Mr. Watson prepared a 
memorandum dated June 9, 2003 to the City's Purchasing Division, recommending 
Poe Asphalt & Paving be given the contract for the 2003 Summer Street 
Maintenance Project because it was the low bidder. Affidavit of John Watson, " 
6 - 8, R. 33 - 34. Included in that memorandum was a "bid tabulation" for several 
the contractors who bid on the street maintenance project. ffidavit of John 
ItVatson, , 6, R. 33 - 34. The bid tabulation contained a table specifically 
identifying the items that the contractors would be responsible for purchasing and 
installing as part of the street maintenance project. Affidavit of John Watson, Ex. 
B. On that table, item No. 603~ 1, R. 50 described a catch basin, !\tvo of which 
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were required for the street maintenance project. Affidavit of John Watson, , 7 
and Ex. B. Item 605-1, R. 50, the table also listed twelve inch PVC storm sewer 
pipe. Affidavit of John Watson, , 7 and Ex. B, R. 50. Both of these item numbers 
correspond with the design for the bubble-up system which had been prepared by 
Mr. Watson. Affidavit of John Watson, , 7 f R. 34. 
After Mr. Watson's memorandum was submitted to the City Purchasing 
Division, it was forwarded to the City Clerk. Affidavit of Kari Kuchmak, , 5, R. 55. 
The document was then attached to the agenda for the June 9, 2003 Lewiston 
City Council meeting, and copies were prepared for the Council members. Affidavit 
of Kari Kuchmak, Ex. A, , 4 R. 55. 
On June 9, 2003, the Lewiston City Council met at 7:00 p.m. at Lewis and 
Clark State College. Affidavit of Kari Kuchmak, , 8, R. 55. Item H on the consent 
agenda was the 2003 Summer Street Maintenance Project. Affidavit i{ad 
Ex. A, 'V. H. R. 57 - 58. The minutes for the City Council meeting 
show that the 2003 Summer Street Maintenance Project was unanimously 
approved by the City Council. Affidavit of Kuchmak, Ex. C, 'V. H, R. 66 - 71. 
On June 12, 2003, the City of Lewiston sent a notification to Poe Asphalt & 
Paving that it had been awarded the contract for the 2003 Summer Street 
Maintenance Project. Affidavit of John Watson, , 9, R. 34. Thereafter, on June 
26, 2003, the City of Lewiston sent Poe Asphalt and Paving a Notice to Proceed 
with the work on the project. Affidavit of 
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Watson, , 10, R. 34. Poe Asphalt 
was to begin work on June 27, 2003, and was required to complete the work by 
September 15, 2003. Affidavit of John Watson, Ex. 0, R. 53, The change in the 
storm drain system was completed in 2003. 
Several years later, on May 19, 2006, a sudden thunderstorm dumped a 
large amount of rain on the Lewiston area in a short period of time. The 
Thompsons filed a Complaint against the City on January 29, 2007. (Complaint, 
R. 14 - 18). According to the Thompsons, runoff water traveled down 21 st Street 
towards their property. (Complaint, 'V, R. 16). Plaintiffs allege that the bubble-up 
system was ineffective, and allowed a portion of the storm water to run across the 
surface of Idaho Street, flowing in a northwest direction, over the Thompsons' 
sidewalk and onto the Thompsons' property allegedly causing damages. 
(Complaint, 'V. R, 16). 
1. ISSUES 
issues on appeal: 
II 
II. 
Following are Respondents' restated 
V\Jhen the District Court dismissed Thompsons claims based on discretionary 
immunity as provided in i.C.§6-904(1), did it err in concluding that discretionary 
immunity was applicable to the decision to change the type of storm water gutter 
system at the intersection of 21 st Street and Idaho Street in Lewiston, Idaho? 
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2. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
When the District Court denied The City's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
grounds of design immunity as provided in I.C. § 6-904(7), did it err in concluding 
that design immunity was not applicable when the City Council approved the bids 
for the 2003 Summer Street Maintenance Project which included the change in 
the storm water gutter system at the intersection of 21 st Street and Idaho Street 
in Lewiston, Idaho .. 
The City acknowledges that the Appellant's Opening Brief raises the issue of 
whether the District Court properly granted the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the grounds of discretionary immunity as allowed by I.C. §6-904(1}. 
In addition, the City asserts that the Thompsons' Opening Brief also raises the 
issue of whether the District Court properly denied the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment with respect to design immunity as allowed by I.C. 6-904(7}. In 
determining what issues are being appealed, raj reviewing court looks only to the 
initial brief on appeal for the issues presented because those are the arguments and 
authority to which the Respondent has an opportunity to respond in the 
Respondent's Brief. See Marcia Turner v. City 144 Idaho 203, 
211, 159 P.3d 840, 848 citing v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 
122 (2005). 
In the Thompsons' initial Brief, the Thompsons raised, argued and discussed 
the issue of design immunity. The design immunity issue is clearly contained and 
discussed by the Thompsons initial Brief at pages 10 13 and 17 - 20. As a 
result, the City of Lewiston asserts that the District Court's Decision denying the 
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City! s Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds of design immunity should be 
revisited and re-examined by this Court. 
III. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The City of Lewiston is not claiming for an award of attorney! s fees on 
appeal. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing an appeal for the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court in ruling on the 
motion. Sadid v. Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932, 936 (2011). The appellate 
court construes all disputed facts, and draws all reasonable inferences from the record, 
in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the 
evidence in record and any admissions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the issues stated in the pleadings and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id., citing, Infanger of Salmon, 137 
Idaho 45, 46-47 (2002). A trial court's determination of whether a legal duty existed 
under the circumstances is a question of law over which the appellate court exercises 
free review. V. Juker, 119 Idaho 555,556-57 (1991). 
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On a Motion for Summary Judgment, the moving party bears the burden of 
proving the absence of a material fact, and all evidence is construed liberally and all 
reasonable inferences are made in favor of the non-moving party. Sherer v. Pocatello 
School District No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489 (2006). After the moving party has 
satisfied its burden, the non-moving party must then come forward with sufficient 
admissible evidence identifying specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine 
issue for trial. Id. at 489-90; IRep 56(e). Such evidence may consist of affidavits or 
depositions as well as other material based upon personal knowledge which would have 
been admissible at trial. Id. at 490, citing Harris v. State, Department of Health and 
Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,297-98 (1992). Although circumstantial evidence can create a 
genuine issue for trial, a mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Sherer, supra, 143 Idaho at 490. 
B. DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY 
Discretionary Immunity arises from I.e. §6-904(1) of the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act. That statute provides: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course 
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall 
not be liable for any claim which: 
1. Arises out of any act or omiSSion of an employee of the 
governmental entity exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the 
execution or performance of a statutory or regulatory function, whether or 
not the statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function 
or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether 
or not the discretion be abused. 
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JJThe discretionary function exception applies to governmental decisions 
entailing planning or policy formation." Dorea Enter, v. City of Blackfoot, 144 
Idaho 422, 425, 163 P.3d 211, 214 (2007). A two-step process is followed to 
determine the applicability of the exception. Id. 
The first step is to examine the nature and quality of the 
challenged actions. "Routine, everyday matters not 
requiring evaluation of broad policy factors will more 
likely than not be 'operational.' Decisions involving a 
consideration of the financial, political, economic and 
social effects of a policy or plan will generally be planning 
and' discretionary. fI, 
"While greater rank or authority will most likely coincide 
with greater responsibility for planning or policy formation 
decisions; ... those with the least authority may, on 
occasion, make planning decisions which fall within the 
ambit of the discretionary function exception. II The 
second step is to examine the underlying policies of the 
discretionary function, which are: to permit those who 
govern to do so without being unduly inhibited by the 
threat of liability for tortious conduct, and also, to limit 
judicial re-examination of the basic policy decisions 
properly entrusted to other branches of government. 
(internal citations omitted). 
This Court must first consider whether the determination to replace the 
valley gutter system with a catch basin and bubble-up system was a discretionary 
or operational decision. "[T]he discretionary function exception generally includes 
determinations made by executives or administrations in establishing plans, 
specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment 
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and decision there is discretion." City of lewiston v. lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 
855, 853 P.2d 596, 600 (Ct. App. 1993). 
In this case, the Thompsons have alleged that this matter is properly 
considered under design immunity, I.C. §6-904(7) and discretionary immunity does 
not apply. (Appellant's Brief, p. 12). The Thompsons further argue that design 
immunity and discretionary immunity are mutual exclusive citing Bingham v. Idaho 
Department of Transportation, 117 Idaho 147, 786 P.2d 538 (1990). However, in 
Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 886 P.2d 330 (1994), the Idaho court 
acknowledged that either I.C.§6-904(1) or I.C. §6-904(7) may apply to decisions 
pertaining to traffic intersection design. The Lawton, case, supra, involved a 
personal injury claim wherein the design of an intersection was at issue. One of 
the issues was whether discretionary immunity identified in I.C. §6-904(1) was 
applicab!e. !n clarification, the Lall'.!ton Court noted that either I.C. §6~904( 1) or 
I.C. §6-904(7} be applicable. The lawton Court noted that if there was plan 
or design of the highway, then, I.C. §6-904(7} should be reviewed to see if there 
was immunity. If, on the other hand, there was no plan or design, the Court would 
be required to determine whether the City was entitled to discretionary immunity 
under I.C. §6-904(1). lawton, supra, at 460. 
Here, according to the Thompsons' expert, "While the project contract plans 
are stamped by John Watson, a Registered Engineer, they do not qualify as 
engineering design plans in that they lack technical design detail sufficient to insure 
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the installation that would have a comparable functional capacity to the concrete 
alley gutter being removed. (Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p, 3, R. 90). According to Roger H. Tutty, P.E. Plaintiffs' 
expert witness, the City's contract plans are deficient and fail to qualify as 
engineering design plans, in that, among other things, they fail to specify sizes, 
limits, slope measurements and other design parameters essential to ensure the 
design's intended functional capacity. fI (Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 3, R. 90). Thus, the Thompsons, by asserting there is 
no plan or design, portray this matter as one in which discretionary immunity under 
I.C. §6-904(1) may apply. Under I.C. §6-904(1), a governmental entity is entitled 
to absolute immunity regarding claims arising from the performance of a 
discretionary function. lawton v. City of Pocatello, supra, at 460. 
As noted in Dorea Enterprises v. City of Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 1 ~") D ,,),..1 I VV I oVU 
211 (2007), when a Court is determining whether discretionary immunity applies, 
the analysis is a two-step process. The first step is to determine or examine the 
nature and quality of the challenged actions. Routine, everyday matters not 
requiring evaluation or broad policy factors will more likely than not be 
"operational." Decisions involving consideration of the financial, political, economic 
and social effects of a policy or plan will generally be planning and discretionary. 
Dorea, at 425, 
743 P.2d 70,73 (1987). 
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v. City Garden 113 Idaho ,205, 
In the case at hand, the decision to change the valley storm drain system to 
the bubble-up gutter system was one which considered and factored in traffic 
flows and the safety of drivers. According to the Affidavit of John Watson, when 
he designed a plan for removing a three foot wide valley gutter which crossed 
Idaho Street at the intersections of Idaho Street and 21 st Street in Lewiston, Idaho, 
one of the reasons for the removal of the valley gutter was because it was causing 
traffic problems. Affidavit of John Watson, err 4, R. 33. Nothing in the record 
suggests the implementation of the Street Maintenance Project was an operational, 
or everyday function. Further, the Thompsons have not introduced any evidence 
that the replacement of the gutter was an everyday decision. Therefore, the first 
step of discretionary immunity analysis has been met. 
The second step of the discretionary immunity analysis is to evaluate the 
underlying policies to determine if it is discretionary or OPeiational. As noted 
above, if the decision is based upon consideration of its financial, political, 
economic or social it is discretionary. If the decision is a daily, routine 
decision not involving the consideration of policy factors, it is operational. Dorea, 
supra, at 425. 
In this case, the decision to change from a valley gutter to a bubble-up gutter 
was made by John Watson, the City's Assistant Engineer. The primary basis for 
the decision was that the three foot valley gutter was impeding traffic on 21 st 
Street and posed a safety hazard to drivers, According to Mr. Watson's Affidavit, 
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cars had to slow down as they turned onto Idaho Street to avoid striking the 
pavement to the extreme dip of the valley gutter. Affidavit John Watson, 'l1 
4, R. 33. 
The City submits that the decision to change the gutter system to facilitate traffic 
safety is a discretionary decision. Under I.C. §§50-313 and 50-314, Cities have fairly 
broad authority over their streets and traffic. Idaho Courts have recognized that closing 
streets or regulating the kind of traffic on them is a discretionary matter vested in the 
City's governing board and are a discretionary decision and fall within the discretionary 
immunity under I.C. §6-904(1). Christensen v. City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 139, 
124 P.3d 1008 (2005). 
As this Court is well aware, the underlying policies of discretionary function 
immunity is "to permit those who govern to do so without being inhibited by the 
threat of liability for tortious conduct and to limit judicial re-examination of policy 
decisions entrusted to other branches of government. II supra, at 426. 
Here, the decision to replace valley gutter with a bubble-up and catch 
system due to traffic concerns is a discretionary function. Therefore the decision 
to make the change in the gutter system is protected by the discretionary immunity 
provided by I. C. §6-904( 1 }. 
The Thompsons have asserted that Mr. Watson did not have the requisite 
authority and failed to make a sufficient study of the traffic issues before deciding 
to utilize the bubble-up gutter system. The City disputes those arguments. Under 
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Idaho law, [wJhile greater rank or authority will most likely coincide with greater 
responsibility for planning or policy formation decisions; ... those with the least 
authority may, on occasion, make planning decisions which fall within the ambit of 
the discretionary function exception. Dorea, supra at 425. As noted above, Mr. 
Watson was an Assistant Engineer for the City of Lewiston. Affidavit of John 
Watson, ~3, R. 33. Additionally, Mr. Watson's decision and design of the bubble-
up gutter system was approved by the Lowell Cutshaw, City of Lewiston's 
Engineer. Affidavit of Lowell Cutshaw, ~~ 2 - 4, R. 213. Similarly, the change of 
the storm drain system from a valley gutter to a bubble-up gutter system, was 
approved by the then, City of Lewiston, Director of Public Works, Joel Ristau. 
Affidavit of Joel Ristau, 11 4, R. 206 -208. Thus, the change of the gutter system 
from a valley gutter to a bubble up gutter system was approved by mUltiple, high 
ranking Cit", employees, ~v~r. \"Jatson, the City's Assistant Engineei, Lovvell 
Cutshaw, the City Engineer and Joel Ristau, the City's Director of Public Works. 
The Thompsons also argue that Mr. Watson did not conduct sufficient 
studies or gather sufficient information, concerning the change of gutter system. 
However, the statute providing discretionary immunity does not require or specify 
that a specific amount of data or tests be conducted. The Thompsons have not 
cited any statute, regulation or case law which requires some sort of study or 
research before discretionary immunity applies. 
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Accordingly, the City submits that the District Court properly held that 
discretionary immunity is applicable to this situation. It is clear that the decision to 
change the type of gutter system was based upon a traffic consideration. This 
Court has previously held that traffic considerations are discretionary decisions to 
which discretionary immunity attaches. Further, the decision to change the type of 
gutter system based upon traffic considerations was made and/or approved by the 
Assistant City Engineer, the City Engineer and the Director of Public Works. Also, 
the City Council also approved the 2003 Summer Maintenance Project and the 
funds for the project which included and/or incorporated the change of the gutter 
system. Thus, the City's decision to change the type of gutter system is a 
discretionary decision and the District Court's ruling granting the City Summary 
Judgment on that basis should be affirmed. 
C, DESIGN IMMUN!TY 
As noted above, the Thompsons have raised and spent several pages in their 
initial Brief discussing design immunity. The City asserts that such a discussion 
raises the issue of whether the District Court properly denied the City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the grounds of design immunity. The City asserts that the 
District Court erred when it denied the City's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the grounds of design immunity and that this Court should reverse that decision. 
The concept of design immunity is set forth in I.C. § 6-904(7} provides a 
"governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope 
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of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any 
ciaim which:" 
7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction or 
improvements to the highways, roads, streets, bridges, or 
other public property where such plan or design is 
prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or 
design standards in effect at the time of preparation of 
the plan or design or approved in advance of the 
construction by the legislative body of the governmental 
entity or by some other body or administrative agency, 
exercising discretion by authority to give such approval. 
In order to qualify for design immunity, the City is "required to establish the 
existence of a plan or design that was either prepared in substantial conformance 
with existing engineering or design standards or approved in advance by the 
legislative or administrative authority./I Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 
454,459, 886 P,2d 330, 335 (1994) (emphasis in original). 
In this case, neither party has identified any specific engineering or design 
standards which existed in 2003 which the volume of water which must 
be accommodated or handled by the storm water gutter system. The Thompsons 
and their experts or the City have failed to identified an existing engineering or 
design standard which enunciates or identifies the volume of water which a storm 
water system must accommodate adjacent to a city street, such as the rain from a 
5 year storm, 10 year storm, 25 year storm or 100 year storm. Apparently, the 
Plaintiffs' expert assumes, without any basis, that if any water escapes the storm 
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water system, it is defective or inadequate. In effect, the Plaintiffs' expert is 
attempting to impose strict liability upon the City. The City submits that such a 
position is not supported by Idaho law. 
In Lawton, supra, at 459, the Court notes that I.C. § 6-904(7) does not 
require a written plan. Here, as noted above, the City's Assistant Engineer, John 
Watson, drew and stamped a drawing pertaining to the bubble-up gutter system. 
Because Idaho law does not require the plan to be in writing, the fact that the 
design prepared by Mr. Watson is sufficient to constitute a plan under I.C. §6-
904(7). Further, because a plan does not have to be in writing, the alleged 
deficiencies in the plan identified by the Thompsons expert, i.e., the lack 
specifications such as sizes, slope measurements and other specifications do not 
support the argument that no plan exists. 
Although there are no existing standardized engineering or design standards 
pertaining to the volume of water which must be contained by a City gutter 
system, the City submits that Mr. 's drawing, combined with the 
descriptions and/or contained in the bid tabulations, provided contractors with 
sufficient information to bid on and install the bubble-up gutter system. Thus, the 
City submits that the drawing prepared by the City's Assistant Engineer, John 
Watson, approved by the City Engineer, Lowell Cutshaw and the City's Director of 
Public Works, Joel Ristau is a project which was prepared in substantial 
conformance with engineering or design standards. (There has been no claim or 
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allegation that the bubble-up gutter system was not constructed in accordance 
with the design). Thus, the City would assert that the City has met the first option 
for design immunity under I.C. 6-904(7), i.e., that the design was in substantial 
conformance with engineering or design standards in effect at the time of 
preparation of the plan. 
Additionally, design immunity specifications contained in the Idaho statute 
allows an alternative means to qualify for design immunity. Design immunity is 
also applicable if the plan is approved by the legislative body or administrative 
authority of the governmental entity and is obtained prior to the commencement of 
construction. Here, the record is clear that Mr. Watson, the City's Assistant 
Engineer prepared the plan/schematic for the bubble-up gutter system in May of 
2003. Affidavit of John Watson, , 4, R. 33. It is also undisputed that the plans 
were also approved by the then, City Engineer, Lowe!! Cutshaw. Affidavit of 
Cutshaw, 'IT 3, R. 213. Also, Mr. Ristau, the City's Public Works Director in 
2003 approved the plan to modify the storm water system at the intersection of 
Idaho Street and 21 5t Street. Affidavit of Joel ~, 2 - 4, R. 207. 
In addition to Mr. Watson's design being approved by several qualified City 
employees, the project was also approved by the City Council before construction 
commenced. After the various bids were obtained, the matter was submitted to 
the Lewiston City Council for approval. According to the agenda of the Lewiston 
Council, the 2003 Summer Maintenance 
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was item V (H) the City 
Council Agenda for the meeting on June 9, 2009. Affidavit of Kari Kuchmak, ~ ~ 6 
- 8, R. 55. The minutes from the City Council meeting on June 9, 2009, indicates 
that the City accepted the bid from Poe Asphalt, for work included in the Summer 
Maintenance Project (which included the installation of the bubble-up gutter 
system) and approved the expenditure of $855,557.46. Affidavit of Kari 
Kuchmak, ~ V. H., Exhibit C, R. 60. Construction for the 2003 Summer Maintenance 
Project was authorized to commence in the fall on June 27, 2003. Affidavit of John 
Watson, Exhibit 0, R. 53. Thus, it is the City's position that the bubble-up gutter 
system which was part of the 2003 Summer Maintenance Project was approved by 
the City's employees and the City Council prior to the construction of the project 
and/or was approved by those administrators responsible for construction or 
remodeling of City streets. 
The Thompsons concede that the City considered bid proposals and 
approved the expenditure for the 2003 Street Maintenance Project. However, the 
Thompsons assert that there is no evidence that design or plan for the 
storm drain modification was approved by the City Council. In support of the 
argument, the Thompsons rely upon the case of State, Department of 
Public Works, 124 Idaho 658. 862 P.2d 1080 (1993). The Morgan case, however, 
is distinguishable from this situation. in Morgan; the Court specifically noted 
that there was no evidence that the Chief of the Bureau of Building Services had 
the authority to approve the modification design. 
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Here, the Affidavit of Lowell Cutshaw, City Engineer clearly asserts that he 
had the authority to and did approve the plans prepared by the Assistant City 
Engineer, John Watson for the installation of the bubble-up system. Affidavit of 
Lowell Cutshaw, 11 3, R. 213. Similarly, the Affidavit of Joel Ristau, the City's 
Director of Public Works in 2003 also acknowledged that the City Engineer had the 
authority to prepare plans to modify the water system at the intersection of 21 st 
Street and Idaho Street. Affidavit of Joel Ristau, 1111 3 and 4, R. 207. Finally, the 
Affidavit of Janice Vassar, former City Manager for the City of Lewiston from 
1992 - 2006, also acknowledged that the City Engineering Department and/or the 
Public Works Director would have authority to approve maintenance projects, 
including the 2003 Summer Maintenance Project. Affidavit of Janice Vassar, " 7-
10. R 252 - 253. Accordingly, that the City Engineer and the Director of the Public 
Works Department had the requisite authority and approved the design prepared by 
Mr. Watson. As a result, the City of Lewiston submits that the appropriate 
administrative employees of the City approved the ign of the bubble-up water 
system. 
The Thompsons assert that the City must establish that the City Council 
itself must approve the design. In this case, and in many cases involving 
governmental boards, the members of the boards are not engineers or architects. 
In some cases, the drawings, sketches and specifications can involve multiple 
pages or electrical, plumbing, mechanical, structural, heating and air-conditioning 
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technical symbols and terminology. Such technical drawings and sketches may be 
comprehended by architects and engineers, but may be incomprehensible to a City 
Councilmen or other government board members. In such an event, it is appropriate 
for the governmental entity to utilize persons/employees with appropriate 
education, credentials, training and experience to review, draft and approve such 
plans or designs. Such individuals will have a better idea and understanding of the 
plans or design and will be better equipped to evaluate such plans or designs. 
Here, the design or plan in question was prepared by the City's Assistant 
Engineer. The City Engineer approved the design, as did the City's Public Works 
Director. The City asserts that the approval of the drawings or plans by the City's 
Engineer and/or Director of Public Works is sufficient to meet the requirements of 
the statute and to support design immunity under I.C. §6-904(7). Further, 
because the City Council approved the project and authorized the expenditure of 
$8 557.46 for the project prior to the commencement of construction, the City 
has met the requirements of I.C. §6-904(7) and is to design immunity. 
Thus, the Court's denial of the City's Motion for design immunity should be 
reversed. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the City submits that the District Court's decision 
to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims against the City on the grounds of discretionary 
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immunity is correct. The Thompsons have asserted that the design prepared by 
Mr. Watson is inadequate and failed to contain sufficient specific information such 
that no plan or design exists. Idaho law does not require a design or plan to be in 
writing. (Lawton, supra at 459). Thus, the lack of specifics in a drawing does not 
justify or support a claim that no plan or designs exists. However, for purposes of 
summary judgment only and accepting the Thompsons' argument that there is no 
design or plan, the issue then becomes whether the decision to replace the valley 
gutter is a discretionary decision under I.C. §6-904(1). Here, the undisputed 
testimony is that the decision to change the type of gutter was primarily based 
upon traffic issues. Under Idaho law, decisions pertaining to traffic are 
discretionary decisions, and discretionary immunity applies. Therefore, the District 
Court's decision granting the City Summary Judgment based upon discretionary 
immunity is correct and should be affirmed, 
The other issue before this Court pertains to design immunity. The City 
asserts that the District Court erred when it denied the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment based upon I.e. §6-904(7). In this case, the design in question was 
prepared by the City's Assistant Engineer, approved by the City Engineer and the 
City's Director of Public Works. Thus, the City submits that the design was in 
substantial conformance with engineering or design standards at the time the 
design was prepared. Additionally, the project was approved and funded by the 
City Council before the commencement of the construction. Therefore, the design 
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and the project were approved by legislative body or an appropriate administrative 
agency (City Engineering Department and/or Department of Public Works) prior to 
construction and the City is entitled to design immunity pursuant to I.C. §6-904(7}. 
Therefore, the District Court's decision denying the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment based upon design immunity should be reversed and this Court should 
grant the City Summary Judgment based upon design immunity and pursuant to 
I.C. §6-904(7). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /6 day of November, 2012. 
ANDERSON, JULI N & HULL LLP 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~1ry of November, 2012, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF by delivering the same to 
each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, 
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Theodore O. Creason, ISB No. 1563 
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